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Abstract The past two decades have seen large shifts in the constitutional land-
scape of the United Kingdom. This began with the devolution of powers from
Westminster to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland under the first Blair gov-
ernment. More recently, the localism agenda advanced by the Coalition and sub-
sequent Conservative governments has sought to further devolve powers to areas
within England, and the constitutional integrity of the UK itself was threatened by
2014s Scottish independence referendum and the 2016 referendum vote for the UK
to leave the European Union. It is convenient to regard constitutional reform con-
cerned with the dispersal of power through the creation of new executive and
legislative bodies as a modern phenomenon. However, the roots of devolution go
back much further. Largely forgotten is the work of the Kilbrandon Commission,
established to consider the allocation of executive and legislative power within the
UK, which reported in 1973 and effectively produced the first substantial proposals
for the devolution of power from Westminster. Almost two decades on from the
creation of the devolved institutions for Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, the
present moment is as opportune as any to consider the longer-term legacy of the
Kilbrandon Commission. This note revisits the major findings and recommendations
of Kilbrandon and attempts to consider the extent to which these have been realised
in subsequent constitutional reform initiatives. While difficult to quantify its sig-
nificance, it is nonetheless important to recognise the relevance of the commission’s
work for subsequent and unfinished developments within the area of constitutional
reform.
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Introduction
The unprecedented scale of constitutional change witnessed in the period since 1997
might lead to the assumption that pressures for constitutional reform have only
emerged relatively recently. This would be a mistake. Although undoubtedly these
pressures intensified and found favour especially under the Labour government
which entered office in 1997, their origins go back much further and it was under an
earlier Labour government that a royal commission was established in the late 1960s
to specifically probe matters concerning the allocation of power within the United
Kingdom between central government and the UK’s constituent parts. The
Kilbrandon Commission reported in 1973, although its very existence, not to
mention its proposals—which did not meet with unanimity on the part of its
membership—has largely become a mere footnote in constitutional history.1 This is
unfortunate given that the Commission’s discussions touched upon the very kinds of
issues revisited a quarter of a century later when measures to effect devolution to
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland were implemented, and to a lesser extent
when ill-fated proposals for regional government within England were formulated
shortly thereafter. More recent developments, including Scotland’s 2014 indepen-
dence referendum and initiatives to devolve greater powers on combined local
authorities and elected mayors within England, mean that there has not been a more
opportune time to revisit the findings of the Kilbrandon Commission in order to
assess its longer term significance for the constitutional reform agenda.
This note begins by briefly detailing the traditional constitutional structure of the
United Kingdom and the pressures for devolution which resulted in the creation of
the Kilbrandon Commission. It then outlines the remit of the Kilbrandon
Commission, before proceeding to consider its longer-term legacy. In so doing,
attention is given to the Commission’s discussions in four main regards: notions of
national or regional identity; devolution to the UK’s constituent parts; devolution to
the English regions; and missed opportunities to further wider constitutional reform
causes.
The Traditional Constitutional Structure of the United Kingdom
In historic terms, the present day United Kingdom is a relatively recent creation.2 As
one scholar has explained, it ‘‘was not the political outcome of a grand political
design to unite the peoples of the British Isles within a common realm [but] a
contingent outcome of a cumulative process of political integration over centuries,
primarily, though not exclusively, determined by English interests and statecraft.’’3
While England and Wales had been administered jointly since the mid-sixteenth
century,4 union between England and Scotland did not occur until the 1707 Act of
1 For a rare contemporary discussion of the commission’s report, see Daintith (1974).
2 On the early development of the United Kingdom, see Colley (2009).
3 O’Neill (2004: 13).
4 As a result of the Acts of Union of 1536 and 1543, more accurately titled the Laws of Wales Acts.
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Union.5 The 1800 Acts of Union united the three constituent parts of Great Britain
and Ireland within the United Kingdom, although Ireland had essentially been
colonised by English monarchs at least as far back as Tudor times.6
Until the later part of the twentieth century, the only constituent part of the UK
which had posed any significant constitutional challenge to the territorial integrity of
the UK was Ireland, much of the population of which had always been reluctant
subjects of the British Crown. Economic depression in the province in the aftermath
of the potato famine of the mid nineteenth century accelerated the backlash against
British rule. The cause of Irish home rule began to be taken seriously during the
1880s and 1890s, and it was under the premiership of William Gladstone that
attempts to confer home rule upon Ireland first occurred.7 Although finally
legislated upon in 1914,8 home rule was placed on hold when the First World War
broke out, and uprisings against British rule escalated into an Irish war of
independence.9 Although the partition of Ireland into two under the terms of the
Government of Ireland Act 1920, with separate devolved parliaments envisaged for
North and South, was intended to address tensions between the republican and
unionist factions, these provisions were never realised. The 1921 Anglo-Irish Treaty
provided for Irish independence while the six counties in the North remained part of
the UK as Northern Ireland.10 Endowed with its own Parliament, Northern Ireland
enjoyed the ‘‘trappings of a semi-independent state’’,11 although as the province’s
‘troubles’ began to worsen and relations between its political factions entered a state
of deterioration, its devolved institutions were suspended and Northern Ireland fell
under direct rule from London from 1972 onwards.12
Although a conference convened by the Speaker of the House of Commons in
1919 gave some consideration to the possible devolution of legislative and
executive powers,13 with the exception of Northern Ireland, the UK would not
experience any devolution of powers to its constituent parts until the end of the
twentieth century. It has, thus, functioned essentially as ‘‘the largest unitary state
among stable democracies,’’14 with all executive and legislative powers invested in
the UK government and Westminster Parliament. Within this framework, functions
specific to the UK’s constituent parts have been performed by dedicated
5 On the features of the Act of Union, see Devine (2012: ch.1). For a perspective on Scotland’s history as
part of the UK, see Lord Sumption (2014).
6 See Ferguson (2003: 55–57); Killeen (2012: 38–149).
7 See Ferguson (2003: 55–57); Bogdanor (1999: 19–54).
8 Government of Ireland Act 1914.
9 See Killeen (2012: 246–254).
10 On the developments leading to Irish independence, see Hadfield (2003: 591–604).
11 Brazier (1999: 97 et seq).
12 For an overview of devolution to Northern Ireland, see Bogdanor (1999: 55–109).
13 The conference met 32 times before ending in stalemate. On its work, see Evans (2015: 25–6).
14 Bogdanor (1999: 1).
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departments of state.15 Pressures for Scottish home rule began in the second half of
the nineteenth century, with a number of bills promoting this objective being
introduced in Parliament, although not making any real progress.16 This coincided
with what has been described as ‘‘a decisive movement towards the creation of a
more centralised British state.’’17 Unlike Wales, Scotland has throughout its
membership of the union retained and operated its own legal, educational, and
religious systems,18 and in the view of Rodney Brazier, ‘‘That long history of
Scottish institutions, in the main unaffected by the union, must help to explain why
nationalist, or at least devolutionary, sentiment has been stronger in Scotland than in
Wales.’’19 The Scottish Home Rule Association was founded in 1886 and the
Liberal Party took up the cause of home rule shortly thereafter, while the Scottish
Nationalist movement underwent various incarnations and transformations from the
late nineteenth century onwards, culminating in the creation of the Scottish National
Party in 1934.20 The party initially only enjoyed limited support, however, while
Welsh nationalism was an even weaker force. Although Plaid Cymru was created in
1925, there has never been the level of support for the devolution of power to Wales
that there has for Scotland.21 Pressures for the devolution of power to the UK’s
constituent parts, in particular Scotland,22 intensified from the 1960s onwards,23
with then Conservative leader Edward Heath the first major party leader to express
support for any measures of devolution when advocating the creation of a Scottish
Assembly in his 1968 Declaration of Perth.
The Kilbrandon Commission
The creation of the Royal Commission on the Constitution by Harold Wilson’s
Labour government in April 1969 came in response to a perceived growth in support
for nationalist causes in Scotland and Wales, fuelled by Plaid Cymru’s capture of its
first ever parliamentary seat in the 1966 Camarthen by-election and the SNP’s
similarly spectacular victory the following year in the Hamilton by-election.
Constituted initially under the chairmanship of Lord Crowther, it was only
following his death 3 years later that the commission became the ‘‘Kilbrandon
15 The Scottish Office was established in 1885, the Welsh Office in 1965. The Northern Ireland Office as
created in 1972 to take over the functions previously exercised by the devolved by the Northern Irish
government.
16 See Brown (2014: 142–167); Devine (2012: 307).
17 Brown (2014: 158).
18 See Devine (2012: chs.5, 16–17).
19 Brazier (2007: 109).
20 On the development of the Scottish Nationalist movement, see the Kilbrandon Commission report,
vol,1, paras.339–346.
21 On the development of the Welsh Nationalist movement in the early twentieth century, see the
Kilbrandon Commission report, vol.1, paras.347–356. See also Evans (2006).See also Bogdanor (1999:
144–165).
22 See Devine (2012: 574–590).
23 On developments leading to devolution to Scotland and Wales, see Leicester (1999: 251–263).
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Commission’’, when his place was taken by Lord Kilbrandon. It has been noted that
the creation of a royal commission is the ‘‘favoured expedient of a harassed
administration,’’24 and it is in this vein that the creation of the commission can be
seen as an attempt to demonstrate a degree of government responsiveness to
growing pressures for the devolution of power while avoiding the need to address
this with any immediate measures at a time when the governing Labour party had
not reached any consensus itself on such questions.
With an implicit mission to consider the creation of mechanisms which might
stem any potential growth in the tide of nationalism, the Commission’s broadly
worded terms of reference were ‘‘to examine the present functions of the central
legislature and government in relation to the several countries, nations and regions
of the U.K.’’25 The majority of the commission interpreted their terms of reference
relatively narrowly to focus on the possible devolution of power to the countries and
regions of the UK, and to consider whether any changes to constitutional and
economic relationships within the UK were desirable.26 The dissenting minority
felt, however, that the commission had a wider remit than this and extended their
consideration to the functioning of Parliament and political parties.27 However,
there was a degree of consensus in respect of the principles by which the
commission’s work should be guided, both majority and minority reports
emphasising the importance of preserving the political unity of the UK.28 There
was also shared acknowledgment of perceived public distrust of government and
dissatisfaction with the functioning of democracy.29
The members of the commission were unable to reach any consensus upon the
substantive recommendations which they would make, two members taking the
unusual step of publishing their findings in a separate volume to the report.30 Even
the main body of the report represented ‘‘a diffuse and long-winded document in
which it is difficult to disentangle the essential arguments.’’31 The Kilbrandon report
was briefly debated in Parliament,32 but quickly appeared to have been consigned to
the archives and conveniently forgotten about. In spite of this, consideration of the
report nearly a half century later in the post-devolution era demonstrates a longer
term legacy, in particular in signposting the desirability of certain constitutional
reforms which have come to be implemented or continue to feature on the
constitutional reform agenda. For present purposes, we consider the legacy of the
24 Bogdanor (1999: 171).
25 Kilbrandon Report (1973: Vol.I, para.11).
26 Kilbrandon Report (1973: Vol.I, para.13).
27 Kilbrandon Report (1973: Vol.II, ch.1).
28 Kilbrandon Report (1973: Vol.I, para.393; Vol.II, paras.126–128). General guiding principles were,
however, outlined in greater detail within the main report and involved the retention by Parliament of its
supreme authority; avoidance of attempts to create a new constitution in entirety; the need to adhere to the
wishes of the population; and regard for pragmatism. See Vol.I, infra, ch.11.
29 Kilbrandon Report (1973: Vol. I, paras.296–323; Vol.II, paras.34–35).
30 Volume II. For a brief summary see ‘Dissenters urge plan for seven assemblies’, The Times, 1
November 1973, p.5.
31 Bogdanor (1999: 173).
32 HC Deb, 31 October 1973, vol 863, cc163–175.
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Kilbrandon Commission under four principal headings: notions of national or
regional identity; devolution to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland; devolution to
the English regions; and missed opportunities to further wider constitutional
reform.33
The Legacy of the Kilbrandon Commission
National or Regional Identity
The relevance of perceptions of identity to pressures for devolution were central to
the discussion contained in the Kilbrandon report, which alluded to evidence of
growing support for nationalist parties in Scotland and Wales as a central factor in
its creation. The report made observations in respect of Scotland and Wales which
pointed to a strong sense of national identify, such as that ‘‘the cultural and social
attitudes of Scotland have in the past differed quite markedly,’’34 and ‘‘there remains
a strong sense of Welsh identity, a different way of looking at things and a distinct
feeling that the needs and interests of people in Wales must be considered separately
from those of people elsewhere in the UK.’’35 By contrast, it was implied that any
distinct English national identity was much weaker, it being noted that, ‘‘There is no
English nationalist movement.’’36 Whereas Scottish and Welsh pressures for
devolution might be rooted in their minority status within the UK, equivalent
pressures were not detected in England, it being suggested that, ‘‘Probably because
of its dominant position in the UK, there has been no demand for the creation of
institutions of government to serve England as a whole or particular parts of it
comparable to the demands made in Scotland and Wales.’’37 The perception that
stronger demands for devolution existed in Scotland and Wales than was the case in
England undoubtedly informed the proposals advanced by the majority of the
Kilbrandon Commission, which centred on legislative devolution for Scotland and
Wales, but only more minimal devolved powers for English regions.38 There was
also greater support for legislative devolution to Scotland than Wales,39 reflecting
the belief that Scotland was the more favourable of the two countries towards the
introduction of such measures. Although the dissenting minority cited polling data
which suggested that the Scottish were only marginally more favourable to
devolution than the populations of a number of English regions,40 the majority’s
assessment of feelings of national and regional identity has been reinforced in most
subsequent efforts to implement devolution within the UK. These are touched upon
33 For a contemporaneous overview of the Kilbrandon report, see Daintith (1974).
34 Kilbrandon Report (1973: vol.I, para.86).
35 Kilbrandon Report (1973: vol.I, para.130).
36 Kilbrandon Report (1973: vol.I, para.185).
37 Kilbrandon Report (1973: vol.I, para.225).
38 See below.
39 Kilbrandon Report (1973: vol.I, para.1123).
40 Kilbrandon Report (1973: vol.II, para.65).
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in greater detail in the sections which follow, but two points are particularly
important to make at this stage. Firstly, devolution initiatives have focused upon the
creation of institutions of government for Scotland and Wales (and from the late
1990s, Northern Ireland) rather than for England or its regions. This was true of both
the devolution legislation introduced in the late 1970s41 and that successfully
enacted in 1998.42 Although the Blair government would toy with proposals for
directly elected regional assemblies,43 this initiative was soon scuppered in the face
of lacking public enthusiasm after the North-East of England overwhelmingly
rejected the creation of an assembly for their region.44 Opinion polls have only
indicated minimal support for the creation of English regional assemblies.45
Secondly, from Kilbrandon onwards there has always been recognition of a greater
Scottish desire for robust devolved powers. The referendum votes on devolution
held in both 1979 and 1997 reinforced this,46 and in devolution measures to have
been introduced, Scotland has always been bestowed with a greater level of
autonomy.47 That Scotland came close to voting for independence in 2014 further
reinforces the gulf in nationalist aspirations between Scotland and Wales.48
Devolution to Scotland and Wales
The crux of the Kilbrandon proposals centred on the devolution of power to
Scotland and Wales, although there was a notable difference between the approach
taken in the majority and minority reports. While the minority rejected legislative
devolution for Scotland or Wales in favour of a more uniform system of
administrative devolution to seven national or regional assemblies,49 the majority
report advocated a system of Scottish and Welsh devolution which resembled in
large part subsequent legislative proposals and the eventual measures implemented
41 See Scotland Act 1978, Wales Act 1978.
42 See Scotland Act 1998, Government of Wales Act 1998, Northern Ireland Act 1998.
43 See UK Government (2002).
44 See ‘North east votes ‘no’ to assembly’, BBC News Online, 5 November 2004, available at http://
news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/3984387.stm.
45 See, eg., McKay Commission (2013: 18), Curtice (2006: 121).
46 51.6% of Scots backed devolution in 1979 compared to just 20% of Welsh voters supporting
devolution at the same time. By 1997, 74% of Scots supported devolution compared to just 50.3% of
Welsh voters.
47 For example, while Scotland’s Parliament has always enjoyed primary legislative powers, the Welsh
Assembly did not initially enjoy such powers. The Scottish Parliament is also empowered to vary the rate
of income tax within Scotland, which the Welsh Assembly is not. The legislative competence of the
Scottish Parliament also extends further than that of the Welsh Assembly.
48 Scotland’s electorate rejected independence by a 55–45% margin, although the pro-independence
campaign did lead in some opinion polls towards the end of the referendum campaign. See ‘Scottish
independence: Vote ‘will go to the wire’’, BBC News Online, 7 September 2014, available at http://www.
bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-29096458.
49 The minority were motivated by the perceived need to maintain political equality throughout the UK
and proposed seven democratically elected assemblies endowed with weaker, purely administrative
powers, to represent Scotland, Wales and five English regions. See Kilbrandon Report (1973: vol.II,
preface & ch.6).
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by the government of Tony Blair a quarter of a century later. Although disagreed on
the extent of the powers which should be devolved,50 eight members signing the
majority report supported the creation of a Scottish assembly endowed with
legislative powers.51 While there was also broad support for the creation of a Welsh
assembly, only six members felt that it should enjoy the power to legislate,52 two
others believing that it should only exercise delegated powers or advisory
functions.53 For each country, a hundred member unicameral body elected under
the single transferrable vote for 4 year terms was proposed from which a cabinet
would be drawn to exercise executive powers devolved from central government.54
In light of the fact that Northern Ireland had long enjoyed a system of devolution,
only recently suspended at the time as a consequence of the escalating sectarian
conflicts there, no proposals were advanced in respect of the province.
The initial response to the Kilbrandon report was relatively muted. The
commission had been set up by the Labour government against a backdrop of
apparent nationalist pressures, but by the time of its report a Conservative
government was in power and earlier nationalist gains had been lost.55 Indeed, a
Scottish Labour MP noted just a few months before the publication of the report
that, ‘‘This was originally a simple exercise in postponement; it was to get the
Labour Government over the difficulty of what to say about nationalist victories at
the by-elections. Now…the Nationalists are not a serious proposition.’’56 Upon the
report’s publication only a brief debate took place in the House of Commons.57
However, little more than 3 months after the report’s publication, the general
election held in February 1974 saw an unprecedented surge in support for the
Nationalist parties. The SNP breakthrough was particularly noteworthy, it winning 7
seats on 22% of the Scottish vote.58 In that year’s second general election, it would
increase its vote further to 30% of the Scottish total and its parliamentary
representation to 11 MPs.59 It is against this backdrop that the new Labour
government of Harold Wilson included in the Queen’s Speech a commitment to
‘‘initiate discussions in Scotland and Wales on the Report of the Royal Commission
on the Constitution, and [to] bring forward proposals for consideration.’’60 The
50 Kilbrandon Report (1973: vol.I, para.1119).
51 Kilbrandon Report (1973: vol.I, para.1123).
52 Kilbrandon Report (1973: vol.I, para.1123).
53 Kilbrandon Report (1973: vol.I, para.1123). The matters to be transferred are listed in paras.1108 &
1132.
54 Kilbrandon Report (1973: vol.I, paras.1140–44). This would be accompanied by a reduction in the
number of MPs elected by Scotland and Wales, from 71 to 51 and 36 to 31 respectively.
55 The seats gained in Carmarthen and Hamilton by Plaid Cymru and the SNP respectively in earlier by-
elections had been since retaken by Labour at the 1970 general election, although the SNP did gain a seat
(Western Isles) at the same election.
56 John Mackintosh, ‘What prospect for a less United Kingdom?’, The Times, 30 March 1973, p.18.
57 HC Deb 31 October 1973, vol 863, cc163–75. The report was also briefly debated in the House of
Lords. See HL Deb 12 December 1973, vol 347, cc1180–1250.
58 Plaid Cymru also gained two seats in Wales.
59 Plaid Cymru also made a further gain, of one seat.
60 HC Deb 12 March 1974, vol 870, c47.
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report again soon formed the subject of debate in the House of Commons in March
1974,61 Richard Wainwright MP noting when introducing the debate that the recent
general election result had ‘‘probably rescued [the report] from being just a series of
text books.’’62 A similar point was made by Vernon Bogdanor in relation to
devolution generally, commenting that ‘‘Without the rise and electoral success in
the 1970s of the [SNP], it is doubtful whether devolution would have assumed as
prominent a place on the political agenda.’’63 Indeed, just as the Kilbrandon
Commission had rejected separatism as an alternative to devolution, the push for
devolution to Scotland and Wales was motivated by an explicit ‘‘determination to
preserve the unity of the United Kingdom.’’64
Although the Kilbrandon report had been criticised for the lack of unanimity in
its conclusions, supporters of Scottish and Welsh devolution undoubtedly found
much in its content which might serve as the basis for moving forward with the
devolution agenda. There was broad support from the nationalist parties and the
Liberals for implementing devolution on the basis of some of its recommenda-
tions.65 In an early indication of the kind of arguments which would be heard years
later when devolution was finally delivered and again when Scotland launched its
independence bid, Plaid Cymru MPs made a point of noting that Wales had never
returned a majority of Conservative MPs,66 and that a Welsh legislative assembly
would serve as a safeguard against the imposition of ‘‘anti-working class measures’’
on the Welsh electorate by Conservative governments.67
The prospect of the Kilbrandon Commission’s recommendations coming to bear
on constitutional change was apparent in the Labour government’s publication of a
consultative document on devolution during 1974, which led in turn to the white
paper Democracy and Devolution: Proposals for Scotland and Wales.68 The
government endorsed the view of some commission members that it did not ‘‘follow
that Scotland and Wales must be treated exactly like each other,’’69 and the
proposals emanating from the white paper reflected this. While expressing an
intention to create directly elected assemblies for Scotland and Wales, a prospect
unanimously agreed upon—albeit in different forms—by the Kilbrandon Commis-
sion’s membership, it was envisaged that only the former would be conferred with
legislative powers ‘‘in fields in which separate Scottish legislation already exists.’’70
Against the unanimous recommendations of the commission, however, it was
61 HC Deb 20 March 1974, vol 870, cc1087–1171.
62 HC Deb 20 March 1974, vol 870, c1088.
63 Bogdanor (1999: 110).
64 Statement by Edmund Dell MP, Paymaster-General, in HC Deb 19 January 1976, vol 903,
cc925–1076.
65 See, eg., comments made during debates in the House of Commons by David Steel MP and John
Pardoe MP (HC Deb 20 March 1974, vol 870, c1129-1134, 1162–8.
66 Statement by Dafyd Wigley MP (HC Deb 20 March 1974, vol 870, c1161.
67 Statement by D.E. Thomas MP (HC Deb 20 March 1974, vol 870, c1121.
68 UK Government (1974).
69 UK Government (1974).
70 UK Government (1974).
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proposed that the assemblies would be elected on the same basis as the Westminster
Parliament, members being returned in single member constituencies.71 These
proposals to enact some of the key tenets of the Kilbrandon report were developed
in greater detail in a subsequent white paper,72 finding their way to inclusion within
the Scotland and Wales Bill 1976. Then prime minister James Callaghan noted that
‘‘The origins of the bill can be found in the Royal Commission on the
Constitution’’,73 evidently seeing the proposals for Scottish and Welsh devolution
as a variant on some of the Kilbrandon recommendations. Although the government
was forced to abandon this bill, the broad thrust of its proposals resurfaced in 1978
in the form of the separate Scotland Act and Wales Act. Again, it was proposed to
establish a Scottish assembly with legislative powers and a Welsh assembly which
would only enjoy executive powers.74 While in different circumstances Scottish
devolution might have been implemented, given that a majority of Scottish voters
backed the creation of a Scottish assembly in 1979s referendum, the insertion into
the relevant legislation of a requirement that 40% of the total electorate supported
devolution meant that it failed as the low turnout meant that this had not been
achieved.75 The lower levels of Welsh support for devolution were apparent in its
devastating rejection of a proposed Welsh Assembly.76
The election of a Conservative government in 1979 effectively ended any
prospects for the devolution of power within the UK for a generation, although the
campaign for Scottish devolution, in particular, gathered momentum during the
period of Conservative rule,77 strengthened in no small part by the fact that Scotland
found itself subjected to the policies of a government backed by only a minority of
Scottish voters, including most prominently the piloting of the unpopular poll tax in
Scotland. During the 1980s and 1990s, Labour’s appetite for constitutional reform
gradually grew.78 Against the backdrop of increased centralisation of power within
the state, a 1993 report published by the party advocated strong local and regional
government, including the devolution of power to Scotland, Wales and the English
regions.79 A substantive proposal for a Scottish Parliament was presented by the
cross-party Scottish Constitutional Convention in 1995,80 and Labour and the
Liberal Democrats subsequently formed a joint consultative committee on
71 UK Government (1974).
72 UK Government (1975). For discussion, see Mbadinuju (1976).
73 HC Deb 13 December 1976, vol 922, cc974–1150.
74 On the acts, see Bogdanor (1999: 183–191).
75 The ‘Yes’ vote only represented 33% of the total electorate.
76 80% of those voting rejected the devolution proposals for Wales.
77 See, eg., Tierney (2013). Following the creation of the Campaign for a Scottish Assembly in 1985, and
the publication of a key policy document, ‘A Claim of Right for Scotland’ in 1988, a cross-party
commission of all major parties bar the Conservatives met from 1989 to 1996 to build consensus on the
form devolution should take. The resulting document, ‘Scotland’s Claim, Scotland’s Right’, would serve
as the blueprint for the devolution package eventually introduced by the Blair government.
78 See, eg., Labour Party (1989).
79 Labour Policy Commission (1993). See also Labour Party (1995), Labour Party (1996).
80 Scottish Constitutional Convention (1995). For discussion, see McFadden (1995).
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constitutional reform to attempt to identify common ground on which a package of
reform could be built. Its report contained proposals for Scottish and Welsh
devolution,81 as well as measures for new institutions for the English regions and
London.82 Recommendations found within the Kilbrandon Commission report were
central to the devolution proposals developed during this time and would serve as
the basis for the devolution agenda implemented by the Labour government during
its first term.
Devolution was finally delivered to Scotland and Wales by the provisions of the
Scotland Act 1998 and Government of Wales Act 1998 following referendums in
which the populations of the two countries endorsed the creation of a Scottish
Parliament and Welsh Assembly respectively, albeit very narrowly in the case of the
latter.83 Devolution was also restored to Northern Ireland.84 The devolved
institutions created for Scotland and Wales are not carbon copies of the models
envisaged by the majority recommendations of the Kilbrandon Commission.85 For
example, both the Parliament and Assembly were elected using the AMS electoral
system as opposed to the STV model recommended in the Kilbrandon report; their
sizes were larger and smaller respectively than proposed by Kilbrandon;86 and the
scope of their powers also departed somewhat from the Kilbrandon recommenda-
tions.87 However, the principles underpinning Kilbrandon are very much present in
the eventual devolution settlement. Both Scotland and Wales were endowed with a
unicameral elected body from which an executive was to be formed. The distinction
between the approach to be taken to Scotland and Wales drawn back in 1973 is
maintained, Scotland’s Parliament being conferred with primary legislative powers
from the time of its creation, although the Welsh Assembly was not. However, the
recommendation of six members of the Kilbrandon majority that it too enjoy
legislative powers was essentially given effect several years later when primary
legislative powers were finally devolved to the Assembly.88
81 Labour Party & Liberal Democrats (1997: paras.38–46).
82 Labour Party & Liberal Democrats (1997: paras.47–51).
83 50.3% voted ‘Yes’ to the creation of a Welsh Assembly.
84 However, as Northern Ireland did not feature among the Kilbrandon Commission recommendations, it
is not considered here. See, however, Boyle and Hadden (1999).
85 On the systems of devolution introduced by the 1998 legislation, see Hadfield (2011), Leyland (2011:
257-264).
86 The Scottish Parliament comprised 129 members compared to the Welsh Assembly’s 60, whereas the
majority Kilbrandon report had recommended both comprise 100 members.
87 Schedule 5 of the Scotland Act 1998 listed those ‘reserved matters’ beyond the Parliament’s
jurisdiction, these being those areas the nature of which necessitated a UK wide policy, such as national
security, defence, international relations, and immigration. Further powers were devolved under the
Scotland Act 2012, implementing the recommendations of the Calman Commission. The matters for
which responsibility was transferred to the Welsh Assembly were listed in Schedule 2 of the Government
of Wales Act 1998.
88 Government of Wales Act 2006, Schedule 5. The Act essentially implemented the recommendations
of the Richard Commission (2004). See further Hadfield (2011: 222–228), Johnson (2006). Following
recommendations of the Silk Commission (2012), the Welsh Assembly was granted enhanced powers by
the Wales Act 2014.
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In it most fundamental respects, a clear line can be drawn from the core
recommendations of the Kilbrandon Commission majority report to the systems of
Scottish and Welsh devolution introduced and developed from 1998 onwards. The
Commission was created at a time when political circumstances favoured the
implementation of devolution and until the election of a Conservative government
in 1979 intervened, the spirit of its key recommendations came close to realisation.
Over the course of two decades its recommendations continued to serve as the basis
of the devolution agenda developed by the Labour Party for implementation upon its
return to power in 1997. However, an important point must be noted. The initial
pressures which gave rise to the creation of the Kilbrandon Commission stemmed
from a surge in support for Scottish, and to a lesser extent Welsh, nationalism and a
perceived need to further the cause of devolution in order to stem the nationalists’
rise. A stated merit of devolution once again in 1997 was that it would strengthen
the UK by weakening support for separatist causes. The rise of the SNP in Scotland,
the close run independence referendum in 2014, and the party’s landslide capture of
fifty-six of fifty-nine Scottish seats in the 2015 general election might call into
question the extent to which this objective of devolution remains served. It may of
course be that recent events represent a false dawn, just as the successes of the SNP
in 1974 did.89
The English Regions
Clearly influenced by the sense that the forces mobilising behind calls for
devolution in Scotland and Wales were absent in England, neither the majority nor
minority report of the Kilbrandon Commission proposed the devolution of
legislative powers to the English regions. Instead, the majority proposed for
England a scheme of regional coordination in which regional councils would be
endowed with merely consultative or advisory functions, as opposed to the
legislative powers envisaged for Scotland and Wales.90 The bodies would be partly
elected by local authorities in the area, and partly appointed by government
ministers on the basis of relevant expertise.91 By contrast, the minority felt that
legislative devolution for Scotland and Wales with no comparable measures for the
English regions would produce an intolerable anomaly and injustice, not least in
terms of parliamentary representation.92 Its dissenting report proposed a scheme of
devolution which applied in equal measure to English regions, although under
89 Of course, the SNP lost 21 of its 56 seats in the 2017 general election.
90 Kilbrandon Report (1973: vol.I, paras.1195–1209).
91 Kilbrandon Report (1973: vol.I, paras.1195–1209).
92 Kilbrandon Report (1973: vol.II, para.1108. This was essentially a forerunner of the so-called ‘West
Lothian question’, which became particularly pertinent following the devolution of legislative powers to
Scotland in 1998. The essence of the grievance was that whereas Scottish MPs would continue to vote on
issues at Westminster affecting English regions, English MPs would not enjoy the same right on those
issues’ application to Scotland where responsibility had been devolved to the Scottish Parliament.
Reforms to the House of Commons Standing Orders in 2015 sought to remedy this anomaly by enabling
some bills to be certified as applicable only to England (or England and Wales), a veto over the passage of
which was conferred upon MPs representing English constituencies.
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which the democratically elected regional assemblies proposed would not have
legislative competences other than those conferred by delegated powers, instead
undertaking a range of executive and administrative functions.93 A key distinction
between the majority and minority recommendations concerned the areas identified
as serving as the geographical basis for English regions. While the minority divided
England into five large regions,94 the majority envisaged division along lines similar
to those used today for administrative purposes.95
The lesser level of enthusiasm for English regional devolution present in the
Kilbrandon report was evident in the devolution proposals which emerged after the
1974 elections and has been present ever since. The English regions were largely
absent from the devolution debate over the period of this parliament, although a
consultative paper was published on the subject,96 and then Prime Minister James
Callaghan did allude to the possibility of devolving powers to these regions
somewhere down the line.97
When regional devolution for England found itself part of the constitutional
reform agenda of the Blair government alongside Scottish and Welsh devolution,
the more muted enthusiasm for English devolution present in the Kilbrandon report
was again detectable. As per the recommendations of its majority report, the
regional assemblies proposed were not envisaged as being conferred with the scale
of powers devolved to the Scottish or Welsh institutions. In any event, the North-
East’s rejection of a regional assembly in 2004 essentially put to an end any
substantive regional devolution of power to elected assemblies within England and
served as a reminder that the, at best, modest levels of support for English regional
devolution noted by the Kilbrandon Commission were still present. In later years,
any agenda for a uniform, coherent system of elected regional assemblies has been
superseded by the more pragmatic phenomenon of localism, which represents a
more piecemeal yet pragmatic programme of devolving powers from central
government to combined authorities and directly elected mayors to serve broadly
economic objectives.98 Significantly, localism initiatives tend to centre upon smaller
geographic areas than have proposals for English regional assemblies. This may
mean that they facilitate an easier fostering of common identity, it having been
noted that the large regions suggested as the basis for elected assemblies are to some
extent arbitrary and lacking in any shared identity.99
93 Kilbrandon Report (1973: vol.II, paras.217–232). It was also suggested that the chairs of the
assemblies’ executive committes would sit in the House of Lords (para.259).
94 Kilbrandon Report (1973: vol.II, para.215).
95 Kilbrandon Report (1973: vol.I, para.211). The key difference is that the majority included London
within the proposed South-East region, whereas it has in practice come to be regarded as a region in itself
on account of its huge population.
96 UK Government (1976).
97 HC Deb 13 December 1976, vol 922, c984.
98 See Smith & Wistrich (2014).
99 Kilbrandon Report (1973: Vol.I, para.208).
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Wider Constitutional Reform: Missed Opportunities
The main focus of the Kilbrandon Commission was the devolution of power within
the UK, yet its report did touch indirectly upon issues of reform to the electoral
system and the House of Lords, albeit within the context of its devolution proposals,
both issues which would come to feature to varying degrees within the post-1997
constitutional reform agenda. Given Kilbrandon’s acknowledgement of general
public dissatisfaction with the operation of democracy and government, however, it
is arguable that its failure to probe more closely issues pertaining to electoral reform
and reform to the House of Lords represented a missed opportunity to further debate
on matters very relevant to questions of democratic representation.
Both majority and minority recommendations suggested that the proposed
devolved assemblies be elected using the single transferrable vote method of
proportional representation.100 This was significant given that with the exception of
elections to the suspended Northern Ireland Parliament during its early years, there
was no precedent in the UK for using any electoral method other than the first past
the post system. However, when Scottish and Welsh devolution was put to
referendum in 1979 this was on the basis of the proposed assemblies being elected
by the first past the post electoral system in single member constituencies akin to
elections to the Westminster Parliament. The eventual introduction of devolution in
1998 was on the basis of bodies elected by the Additional Member System for
Scotland and Wales, retaining a degree of a proportional element, although Northern
Ireland’s Assembly would be elected under the STV to account for the sectarian
divisions within the province. However, Northern Ireland aside, there has been no
move towards the use of STV and what advances there have been in the campaign
for electoral reform have centred upon other electoral models, albeit usually
unsuccessfully. Although the Jenkins Commission was established to consider the
case for its wider introduction,101 no action was taken in response to its conclusions
and while the alternative vote system has been utilised for contests such as mayoral
contests, its overwhelming rejection in the 2011 AV referendum arguably killed off
pressures for more substantive electoral reform for the foreseeable future. While
entirely speculative, it is possible that had Kilbrandon given greater attention to the
case for electoral reform, it might have garnered more momentum earlier and
possibly enjoyed longer term success.
A similar point can be made in respect of House of Lords reform. Although not
really discussed by the Commission, one suggestion emanating from its minority
was that the leaders of the UK’s devolved bodies enjoy membership of the House of
Lords.102 This proposal has never been taken up seriously, although House of Lords
reform has plagued successive governments since the Blair government acted to
remove the voting rights of most hereditary peers in the late 1990s.103 There has not
yet been a final resolution of the question of the composition of the second chamber
100 Kilbrandon Report (1973: vol.I, paras.788, 1140; vol.II, paras.249–251).
101 See Independent Commission on the Voting System (1998).
102 Kilbrandon Report (1973: vol.II, para.259).
103 Under the terms of the House of Lords Act 1999.
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of Parliament, although one possible option is that of a body comprised of the
representatives of the UK’s nations and regions,104 reflecting some of the tone of the
proposal mooted in 1973. It is perhaps regrettable that Kilbrandon did not take the
opportunity to examine in greater detail the possible relationship between House of
Lords reform and the cause of devolution. Again, whether this would have initiated
a quicker process towards a final and satisfactory resolution of the composition and
status of the House of Lords is highly speculative. Before criticising the apparent
limitations of Kilbrandon too harshly, however, it must be recalled that the key
trigger event giving rise to its creation was the rise of nationalist pressures and to
focus its work almost exclusively on the case for devolution was not an
unreasonable or inappropriate approach towards the discharge of its mandate.
Conclusion
While it is possible to overstate the significance of the Kilbrandon Commission
within constitutional reform debates in the UK, its relegation to a mere historical
footnote is regrettable. Its report gave the first significant consideration to the case
for devolution and advanced proposals which do not diverge radically in the most
part from the devolution settlement eventually implemented in 1998. Had
devolution been delivered successfully in 1979 as attempted by the Callaghan
government, the role of the Kilbrandon Commission within this process would have
arguably been considered significant. However, the relegation of the devolution
agenda down the political agenda for nearly two decades allowed its role in the
devolution debate to be largely forgotten when it found its place firmly back on the
agenda following the election of the Blair government in 1997. The Kilbrandon
Commission’s work should be not given disproportionate credit and, as has been
noted, it could arguably have contributed more substantially to wider constitutional
reform debates. However, it should be recalled for its importance in helping to get
the ball rolling with the development of the devolution agenda in the 1970s which to
some extent paved the way for the eventual successful introduction of Scottish and
Welsh devolution based on a model not radically removed from that envisaged by
some of the Kilbrandon Commission’s membership.
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